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Abstract—We are seeing the deployment of new types
of networks such as sensor networks for environmental
and infrastructural monitoring, social networks such as
facebook, and e-Health networks for patient monitoring.
These networks are producing large amounts of data
that need to be stored, processed and analysed. Cloud
technology is being used to meet these challenges. However,
a key issue is how to provide security for data stored in
the Cloud. This paper addresses this issue in two ways. It
first proposes a new security framework for Cloud security
which deals with all the major system entities. Secondly,
it introduces a Capability ID system based on modified
IPv6 addressing which can be used to implement a security
framework for Cloud storage. The paper then shows how
these techniques are being used to build an e-Health system
for patient monitoring.
Index Terms—Cloud Storage, Security Framework, Ca-
pability Systems, e-Health Monitoring
I. INTRODUCTION
The term Big Data encapsulates the large amounts
of data being produced in digital environments. New
networks, such as sensor networks, e-Health systems
for patient monitoring [1] and social networks which
promote human interaction, are producing data at a
phenomenal rate. This data needs to be efficiently stored,
processed and analysed. Cloud technology, being devel-
oped by Cloud Providers such as Amazon Services and
Rackspace, is being deployed to meet these challenges.
However, a major issue remains of how well data
can be secured in a Cloud environment. Data needs to
be accessible not just to producers and consumers of
that data but also to Cloud Infrastructure Agents who
might need to migrate or replicate data based on access
demands. For example, moving data, beforehand, nearer
to the compute engines that will process the data may
bring significant energy savings. Security mechanisms
must therefore take account of such realities.
Though there have been several research efforts trying
to deal with the security of Cloud storage [2], the authors
believe a new and comprehensive framework is required
to provide the kind of operational flexibility needed in
Cloud environments. Furthermore, the issue of how the
proposed functions in this Cloud Security framework are
developed into mechanisms needs to be addressed. The
authors believe that a capability-based approach could
be adopted with great effect to develop the required
mechanisms. Hence this paper explores the development
of a Capability ID system and shows how such a system
could be used to build an e-Health system for monitoring
patients.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows: Section
2 looks at common elements of the Cloud Environment
while Section 3 details the New Security Framework
for Cloud Storage. Section 4 introduces the idea of
Capabilities. Section 5 introduces a new Capability ID
system while Section 6 shows how this new Capabil-
ity ID system is used to develop a Cloud Storage system
for e-Health monitoring of patients. Section 7 details
current work being done to build a real system. The paper
concludes in Section 8.
II. UNDERSTANDING CLOUD ENVIRONMENTS
The Cloud environment is a relatively new computing
environment. It uses virtualization to deliver resources
such as computing, memory, storage and networking
facilities to applications. This is done by the use of a
hypervisor which provides a virtual environment that
interacts with the Cloud Infrastructure. The hypervisor
therefore is the boundary between the application and
the Cloud Infrastructure. Normal virtualization, in which
2there is a Host OS as well as a Guest OS, has given way
to Bare Metal Virtualization using para-virtualization
techniques. In Bare-Metal virtualization, the hypervisor
replaces the Host Operating System and directly controls
the hardware.
In addition, there are three Cloud paradigms which
have taken hold. IaaS, Infrastructure as a Service, works
to replace company infrastructure such as desktops and
servers with Cloud infrastructure using virtual machines.
Amazon Services is an example of an IaaS company.
PaaS, Platform as a Service, allows programmers that
develop Cloud programs using Cloud Infrastructure via
a Cloud-based Software Development Kit (SDK). The
Google Application Engine (GAE) is an example of
PaaS. Finally SaaS, Software as a Service, is used
to provide company software such as Customer Re-
lations Management (CRM) and Enterprise Resource
Planning (ERP). Salesforce.com is an example of an
SaaS provider.
A. Issues in Cloud Security
The paradigms described above do not directly address
the issues of providing secure data access and storage in
the Cloud because the Cloud was initially viewed as a
replacement of the company’s infrastructure and so the
security mechanisms that were associated with servers
were thought to be adequate. This has not proven to be
the case for a number of reasons. Firstly there is now
a recognition of the growing importance of data in the
context of company identity. The data generated by a
company is now regarded as a key part of a company’s
DNA. In addition, company data is administered in
a very sophisticated way: not all data is available to
everyone. Some types of data are very sensitive even
within companies.
B. The Firesmith Framework for Reusable Security
The Firesmith Framework is a detailed specifica-
tion [3] which attempts to provide a comprehensive
security framework. It consists of nine layers: access
control, attack harm detection, non-repudiation, integrity,
security auditing, physical protection, privacy and con-
fidentiality, recovery and prosecution. This framework
provides a detailed analysis of the required functionality
and therefore is able to serve as a reference model. Al-
though this framework is significant, the authors believe
that a new framework is required which incorporates the
functionality of the Firesmith Framework in the contexts
of major entities such as applications and users as well
Fig. 1: The Cloud Security Framework
as Cloud Infrastructure facilities such as the hypervisor
and Storage Servers.
III. THE NEW SECURITY FRAMEWORK
The new Security Framework is shown in Figure 1.
 User Security Layer: This layer is concerned with
user authentication and authorization. Users start by
authenticating themselves to the local device [4] as
well as to the application. This authentication leads
to the authorization of the user to use application
resources.
 Application Security Layer: This layer is used to
authenticate the application to the hypervisor. This
layer is also used to authenticate the user to the hy-
pervisor and vice-versa if access to the user’s data is
required. This security layer is also responsible for
Presentation Security which encodes and decodes
data between the application and the Cloud Storage
System. Where the data belongs to the user, this
layer acquires the relevant keys to ensure that the
user’s data is also protected.
 Hypervisor Security Layer: This is the layer that is
implemented in the hypervisor. This layer is used to
authenticate the application and user security layers
to the Cloud Infrastructure. This layer is also used
to generate capabilities which allow applications to
access the required resources in the Cloud Infras-
tructure. It also checks that there is no violation due
to cloud personnel accessing relevant information in
order to maintain a Cloud Infrastructure. For exam-
ple, the blocks of a file maybe copied by a system
administrator but contents of the file should not be
read by those working for the Cloud Provider. This
layer therefore acts as the data interface between
3the upper layers described above and the Cloud
Infrastructure.
 Transport Security Layer. This layer can provide
secure communication between the application and
the Cloud Infrastructure. It is now possible to look
at secure transport protocols which provide protec-
tion of data using secure links. New protocols such
Simple Protocol (SP) [5] allow quick authentication
using key exchange mechanisms such that a secure
key is generated and used for moving data between
the application and the Cloud Infrastructure.
 Storage Security Layer. This layer is about securing
blocks of data in the Cloud Infrastructure. This will
involve securing blocks using encryption techniques
such as AES and DES algorithms. In addition,
each block is hashed after it has been modified to
ensure no unauthorised modifications. In order to
ensure 100% availability, blocks may be replicated
throughout the Cloud Storage structure. Therefore a
coherency protocol within the storage layer is used
to synchronize different copies of the block.
IV. THE USE OF CAPABILITIES
Capabilities were first used in the memory protection
system of the CAP computer [6] developed by the
Computer Laboratory at the University of Cambridge,
UK. The CAP system used a Capability Unit (CU)
in which computation could only proceed if the right
capability was loaded into the CU. This therefore pro-
tected different memory segments and thus facilitated
multiprogramming. This idea did not catch on and the
next major use of capabilities was within the Ameoba
Distributed Operating System [7]. Here a capability
was a software construct which specified the right of
its holder to invoke operations on a defined operating
system object via a communications port.
A. Using IPv6 format
IPv6 is the new generation of the Internet Protocol
Suite. The IPv6 format is given in Figure 2. The devel-
opment of IPv6 encouraged new approaches to address
some key issues. This is because an IP address attempts
do two things: it is used to identify the network interface
to which the packet is sent and it is also used to route
packets to the destination. This dual functionality meant
that it was difficult to dynamically optimize network
routes in mobile environments. This led to better support
for addressing in IPv6 [8]. In addition, IPSec [9] which
is a security framework for IP that allows the setting up
of secure connections using encryption and tunnelling
Fig. 2: IPv6 Header Format
has been designed to work with IPv6. However, though
IPv6 can be regarded as a technical improvement on
IPv4, these improvements have not been able to be fully
used in environments such as mobile and Cloud systems
where greater flexibility is required. This has led to the
development of new architectures such as Y-Comm [10]
and Mobile Ethernet [11] for building future mobile
networks. This paper in turn suggests that IPv6 should be
modified to give more support to Cloud Environments.
V. MODIFYING THE IPV6 ADDRESS TO SUPPORT A
CAPABILITY-ID SYSTEM
The address space of IPv6 affords the opportunity
to design a capability ID based system for users, ap-
plications and Cloud infrastructure. Objects and their
properties are identified by the use of capabilities. Capa-
bilities therefore need to be carefully managed and need
to be protected against being created or changed in an
inappropriate manner. The new capability uses the whole
128 bit field of an IPv6 address and is shown in Figure 3.
 The Type Field (8 bits). This field is used to
specify the type of object capability that is being
used. Types could include Cloud Providers, Cloud
platforms, users, applications, etc. In order to help
administer the system, a special object type known
as a Capability List or CL has been created. The
CL is used to group a list of capabilities together. In
terms of Capabilities List, there is a property called
common. A common Capability List belongs to all
the users in the system.
 The Property Field (12 bits). This field is used to
define the properties of the object. This field is
divided into properties to do with the capability
itself and properties of the object that the capability
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represents. The capability related fields are given by
three bits:
1) The System or S bit. This indicates whether
the object involved has been created by the
system or by an application or user. System
capabilities cannot be modified or deleted by
users or applications.
2) The Master or M bit. This bit indicates that
the capability was created by a Certificate Au-
thority or CA. If this bit is zero, it means that
this is a Proxy capability. Proxy capabilities
are derived from Master capabilities. Proxy ca-
pabilities cannot be derived from other proxy
capabilities.
3) The Change or C bit. This bit is used to
indicate whether or not this capability can be
changed. This means that if this bit is not set,
no proxy certificates can be derived from this
capability.
The other 9 bits are used to define properties of the
object that is related to the type.
 The Object Id (72 bits). This field is used to
uniquely identify the object. In order to be com-
patible with the current Internet, a location/ID split
architecture [12] is used. So the first 32 bits are an
IPv4 address which is used to indicate where the
object is located or resides. This will apply to all the
network-based entities in the Cloud Infrastructure.
 The Random Bit Field (24 bits). This field helps
to uniquely identify the object. The random bit
field is generated when the object is created. When
Proxy certificates are created a new random field is
generated.
 The Hash Field (12 bits). The Hash field is used to
prevent the casual tampering of capabilities.
So when an object capability is created the type,
properties and Object Id fields are first generated. Then
the random bits are generated. Finally these fields are
used to generate a SHA-1 hash which is placed in the
Hash Field of the capability. Once a Master capability is
created, if the CHANGE bit is set, then it is possible to
narrow the use of the object by other entities by creating
proxy capabilities.
VI. BUILDING A SYSTEM TO MANAGE E-HEALTH
In this section we look at how we would use the
Capability ID system and the Security Framework in
a system to monitor patients. This system has been
designed to allow patients to be monitored from their
homes.
Firstly, we start by identifying key entities in the
system. We detail these entities below:
 Users: There are different groups of users of the
e-Health system including patients, carers, nurses,
doctors, consultant. This arrangement fits well into
a role-based security scheme in which each user is
given a unique capability and a role-based property
which specifies their role within the Health System.
Each health professional will have four Capability
Lists: the first is their private CL which is known
only to them. The second CL is a common CL for
their role. So there is a common CL for doctors,
another for nurses, etc. The third CL is a common
CL for the Health Profession as a whole. So things
such as codes of conduct, procurement procedures,
and other professional practices are handled by this
CL. The four CL is a common CL that is used by
everyone working on a particular site.
 Devices: There are a number of devices also in-
volved. The first is an e-Health band which is
worn by the patient. The band itself has its own
object ID but it also stores the object ID of the
patient as well as the object ID of the server. The
monitoring device uses the local Wi-Fi network to
connect to the Server at the surgery/hospital which
is responsible the patient.
 Servers: Servers are machines through which pa-
tients records are accessed. The servers run e-
Health monitoring applications which use a special
Distributed File System to store patients’ records.
The Distributed File System uses the Cloud to store
blocks of data.
 Cloud Block Storage Systems: The Block Servers
can retrieve blocks that have been identified as part
5Fig. 4: The Remote Patient Monitoring System
of a file. Blocks can be replicated and migrated
based on load demand and user mobility.
A. Operational Issues
When the monitoring device needs to take a reading,
it reads the band and finds the server object to which the
data must be forwarded. The monitoring device makes a
secure connection to the server using a PKE mechanism
to exchange a shared key. When the server is given the
latest reading, it reads the object ID of the patient and
generates a new file in which the latest readings are
stored. After the data is stored in the Cloud, a notification
is sent to the doctor who is looking after the patient.
The notification has the name of the file which contains
the new readings. The data blocks of this new file are
stored in the Cloud. The operational diagram is shown
in Figure 4.
B. The File System
The File System is a Distributed File System that
encrypts all the data blocks. The data blocks are repli-
cated and placed randomly on a number of Cloud Block
Storage servers. In order to improve security the inode
or meta-data part of the file is not stored in the Cloud.
The meta-data is protected so that if an intruder manages
to decode a data block; it would still be very difficult to
read the whole file. The new file system is shown in
Figure 5
VII. CURRENT WORK
A. Secure Transport in LAN/Cloud Environments
In this section, we look at the need to develop se-
cure transport which can also perform efficiently in the
LAN/Cloud Environment. An examination of network
Fig. 5: New File Structure
interactions at the local area level clearly indicates that
there is a need for much more transactional support
at the LAN/Cloud level as there is a large amount of
client/server interaction in order to use network services.
Some services such as NFS have developed their own
reliable transport [13], but there is a need for a more
generic protocol of this type which can be used by
many client/server applications. In addition, LAN speeds
are continuing to increase in both wired and wireless
networks. In wired networks, 1 Gbps is quite common
and 10 Gbps is already being deployed [14]. There have
been several attempts to tune WAN protocols like TCP,
but these has been met by limited success.
Fig. 6: The Simple Protocol
1) The Simple Protocol: In order to explore these is-
sues further, a new transport protocol has been developed
which is optimised for the local area. Called the Simple
Protocol or SP, its specification is detailed in [5] and
6shown in Figure 6. Unlike TCP, SP is a message-based
protocol, where messages are divided into blocks before
transmission over the network interface. SP provides
a reliable service and can run over unreliable data
substrates such as UDP or raw Ethernet. A secure version
of SP has been specified and has been tested using
AVISPA [15].
B. Preliminary Results
In order to implement a totally secure environment,
we need to have transport mechanisms which are more
closely controlled by the application or the server. This
means that the transport protocol must be able to run
both in User Space (US) and Kernel Space (KS). Clients
run the protocol in User Space, but servers may run in
User Space or Kernel Space depending on the complexity
of the service. However, we need to know if running
in User Space imposes an unacceptable degradation in
performance. So we have conducted preliminary tests
which measured the situations of both client and server
are running in User Space; and where the client is in
User Space and the server is Kernel Space. These results
were compared with a standard in-kernel version of TCP.
These tests were performed in a Network Laboratory
on a 1 Gbps Ethernet Network with no effective load.
SP ran over UDP and the transport data block size was
kept to 1472 bytes so as to mimic segmentation done by
TCP. The machines ran up-to-date versions of the Linux
kernel. The results are shown in Figure 7. This shows
that SP can perform effectively in User Space and Kernel
Space while providing greater flexibility.
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VIII. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have presented a new Security
Framework for providing Cyber-security in Cloud Envi-
ronments. A Capability ID system has been developed
as a mechanism by which the Framework could be
implemented. The system is being developed to support
e-Health applications that involve the monitoring of
patients in their homes and storing the data in a Public
Cloud environment.
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